Deceleration in female labor force participation in Latin America by Gasparini, Leonardo Carlos & Marchionni, Mariana
1 9 7
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  This paper is based on a recent book edited by the authors, which was writ-
ten at the Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS).1 The book is part 
of the project “Enhancing Women’s Economic Empowerment through Better Policies in Latin 
America,” a joint initiative with CIEDUR, which was carried out with the aid of a grant from 
the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada. This paper includes a more 
technical and thorough discussion of the evidence and the determinants of the deceleration in 
female labor supply in the region. The authors are grateful to Joaquín Serrano, Pablo Gluzmann, 
Nicolás Badaracco, Rosa Vidarte, and Mariela Pistorio for excellent research assistance; and to 
Carolina Robino, Guillermo Cruces, Alma Espino, Jorge Paz, Martín Tetaz, Facundo Albornoz, 
and Roxana Maurizio, seminar participants at AAEP (Posadas, 2014), Network of Inequality and 
Poverty (UNGS, 2014), Conference on Social Protection (IDRC and IPC, Brasília, 2014), and 
IDB (Washington, D.C., November, 2015), and to the editor and two anonymous referees for 
valuable comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.
1. Gasparini and Marchionni (2015).
Deceleration in Female Labor Force 
Participation in Latin America
ABSTRACT  After half a century of sustained growth, female labor force participation has decel-
erated in Latin America, especially among married vulnerable women. Based on a large data-
base of microdata from household surveys, this paper documents this recent deceleration and 
provides evidence on the determinants. We argue that the fast economic growth experienced 
by the region in the 2000s was an important driving force: lower unemployment and higher 
earnings of male partners plus increased social assistance may have reduced the pressing need 
for vulnerable women to take low-quality jobs.
JEL Codes: J2, J1
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The strong increase in female labor force participation (LFP) is arguably among the most salient socioeconomic changes in Latin America in the last half-century. This fact not only implies a profound transformation in 
the daily life of millions of Latin American women and families, but also has 
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substantial economywide labor and social consequences. Poverty, inequal-
ity, unemployment, and education—just to mention a few social issues—are 
all affected by a more intense entry of women into the workforce. Although 
remarkable, this long-run pattern of female gains has not been enough to 
close the gender gap. Gender equality in the labor market remains a difficult 
challenge in the region.
This paper explores a change in the trend of female labor force participa-
tion that makes the situation potentially more worrisome: after around half a 
century of sustained growth, there are clear signs of a widespread and signifi-
cant deceleration in the entry of women into the Latin American labor mar-
kets. That deceleration took place even when the typical factors that account 
for the long-run increase in female LFP, such as innovations or expansions in 
health, home, and work technologies and some cultural changes, continued 
operating.2 The deceleration appears to have begun in the early 2000s, and it 
applies to all groups of women, but particularly to those who are married and 
in more vulnerable households.3 Therefore, the slower entry of women into 
the workforce has delayed the closing of the gap in labor participation not 
only between men and women, but also between vulnerable women and the 
rest.4 Although a similar pattern has emerged in other regions of the world, 
such as the United States since the 1990s, some Nordic economies, and some 
East and South Asian countries, the stagnation in female labor force participa-
tion is not a general phenomenon among developed or developing economies, 
which suggests that the recent deceleration observed in Latin America has 
regional origins that need to be explored.5
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on gender and labor 
participation in Latin America.6 First, we provide careful evidence on female 
LFP based on microdata from a large set of national household surveys. In 
particular, the paper unveils a potentially interesting fact, which has not yet 
been sufficiently highlighted: after several decades of steep and uninterrupted 
increase, the pace of growth in female labor force participation slowed sub-
stantially in the 2000s. We believe this changing scenario should be placed 
2. Busso and Romero Fonseca (2015).
3. We do not distinguish between women who are legally married and women who cohabi-
tate with a partner in consensual unions; for simplicity, we include both groups in the married 
category.
4. It also hinders the fulfillment of the gender-equality Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) related to female employment.
5. On the United States, see Blau and Kahn (2013) and Goldin (2014).
6. See, for example, Amador, Bernal, and Peña (2013); Chioda (2011); Elias and Ñopo 
(2010); Piras (2004); and Cord, Lucchetti, and Rodríguez-Castelán (2012).
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high in the research agenda, jointly with the traditional inquiry on the causes 
of the long-run increase in female participation.
Second, the paper delves into various alternative hypotheses on the contrast 
between the rapid growth in female labor force participation in the 1990s and 
the deceleration in the 2000s. Identifying causal relationships for complex 
socioeconomic variables in a large geographic region is extremely difficult. 
The evidence shown in this paper is not conclusive, and it admits of alternative 
explanations. Our preferred interpretation of the existing body of evidence is 
that the fast economic growth experienced by the region in the 2000s was an 
important—although not the only—determinant of the deceleration in female 
LFP. Lower unemployment and higher wages of other income earners in 
the household (mostly male partners), plus increased social assistance, may 
have reduced the pressing need for vulnerable women to take low-quality jobs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly 
describe the data and present the basic evidence of deceleration in female 
labor force participation in Latin America. We then estimate the contribution 
of changes in the distribution of different variables to the observed changes in 
female LFP based on decomposition exercises. Subsequently, we argue that 
the hypothesis that the deceleration is the result of female LFP approaching a 
ceiling is not very plausible, and we present our preferred hypothesis linking 
the deceleration to the fast economic growth experienced by the region in the 
2000s. To deepen that argument, we explore the movements of female LFP 
along the business cycle. The paper closes with some concluding remarks.
The Deceleration in Female Labor Force Participation
There are two main types of data sources that are useful for studying labor 
force participation: household surveys and censuses. This paper is based on 
the former, given that survey data allow a closer monitoring of developments 
in the labor market, since information is collected on a yearly basis and not 
every ten years as in censuses.7 In particular, we process microdata from 
a large database of national household surveys: namely, the Socioeconomic 
Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), a project jointly 
developed by the Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS) 
at the National University of La Plata, Argentina, and the Latin America and 
7. For a methodological discussion of this and other topics, see our companion book 
(Gasparini and Marchionni, 2015).
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the Caribbean Poverty Gender and Equity Group (LCSPP) of the World Bank. 
We focus the analysis on unweighted averages across all Latin American 
countries, and we restrict the sample to people aged twenty-five to fifty-four 
years.8 The study covers the period from 1992 to 2012. That period is natu-
rally divided into two decades: 1992–2002 and 2002–12. While the division 
is arbitrary, it captures changes in some fundamental socioeconomic vari-
ables: in the early 2000s, most Latin American economies entered a phase 
of strong economic growth with falling poverty and inequality, while their 
governments intensified social and labor policies. For simplicity, we refer to 
1992–2002 as the 1990s and 2002–12 as the 2000s.
The strong increase in female LFP is arguably one of the central stylized 
facts that describes the dynamics of the Latin American labor markets in the 
second half of the twentieth century.9 The process of increasing female labor 
force participation continued at high speed throughout the 1990s, at a rate of 
0.9 percentage points a year, but it slowed substantially in the 2000s, down 
to 0.3 percentage points a year (figure 1). In contrast, the participation rate 
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 Source: Authors’ calculations, based on microdata from national household surveys.
a. Adults aged twenty-five to fifty-four years. Unweighted means for Latin American countries.
F I G U R E  1 .  Female and Male Labor Force Participation: Latin America, 1992–2012a
8. To process microdata within each country, we weight the data using the sample weights 
that correspond to each national survey. However, we do not use population weights when we 
compute averages across countries, to prevent our assessment from being strongly affected by 
highly populated countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, while almost ignoring less-populated 
nations. Table A1 in the appendix summarizes information about the national surveys used in 
this study. For more details on the data, see CEDLAS and World Bank (2015).
9. Chioda and Demombynes (2010); Chioda (2011).
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of prime-age males remained above 95 percent, with no significant changes 
over the period.
The deceleration in female LFP has taken place in all groups, but it is par-
ticularly noticeable among married and vulnerable women, that is, women 
with low levels of education, living in rural areas, with children, and married 
to low-earnings partners (figure 2). For example, in the 1990s, the participa-
tion rate increased 0.8 points a year for women with low education (without a 
high school degree) and 0.24 points for those with tertiary education, whereas 
in the 2000s the rates were 0.17 and 0.13 points a year, respectively. The 
contrast between decades is also noticeable across quintiles of the spouses’ 
income distribution (panel D in figure 2). For women in the first (poorest) 
quintile, the participation rate grew by 14 percentage points in the 1990s 
but only 1 percentage point in the following decade. The difference between 
decades was less marked—but still noticeable—for women in the fifth (rich-
est) quintile, whose participation rate grew 10 and 2 percentage points in the 
1990s and 2000s, respectively.
As in other regions of the world, the increase in female LFP in Latin 
America was especially marked among married women. The participation 
rate among single women was already high in the early 1990s and it increased 
at lower rates. For both groups the rapid increase came to a halt in the early 
2000s; that trend is particularly evident among the married, since it contrasts 
with the dramatic growth in the previous decade (figure 3).
Regarding other labor variables, changes in hours of work for female 
workers were not large, not very different between decades, and not signifi-
cantly different from those of men. Likewise, changes in unemployment seem 
to have been small and with no significant gender differences. These patterns 
reinforce the claim that the dynamics of labor force participation are among 
the most noticeable labor phenomena with a clear gender dimension over the 
last decades.10
In the following sections we carry out a preliminary examination of the 
factors that could be behind the deceleration in female participation. We start 
with a typical within-between decomposition.
10. The dynamics of the so-called nini phenomenon (that is, people who are neither work-
ing nor studying, from the Spanish ni estudia ni trabaja) also has a clear gender dimension. 
The share of female ninis dropped over the period of analysis, while the share of male ninis 
increased marginally (de Hoyos, Rogers, and Székely, 2016). Although the decreasing trend 
characterizes both decades, the share of female ninis decreased faster in the 1990s than in 
the 2000s. For women aged twenty-five to fifty-four, the share of ninis decreased at a rate of 
0.9 percentage points a year in the 1990s, but only 0.5 percentage points a year in the 2000s, 
which is consistent with the deceleration in female LFP in the latter decade.
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Decompositions
To assess the impact of changes in the distribution of some variables on the 
aggregate female LFP rate, we implement a decomposition in which the popu-
lation of potential female workers is partitioned based on some covariate of 
labor participation, such as education levels. The change in the aggregate 
female participation rate over time could be decomposed into two terms: a 
weighted average of the changes in LFP within groups—the within effect—
and a weighted average of the changes in the share of women in each group—
the composition effect.11 Analytically,
∑ ∑∆ = ∆ + ∆ ,
124 34 124 34
P w P P wt k k
k
Within
k k
k
Composition
where P is the overall rate of female labor force participation, Pk is the par-
ticipation rate for group k, wk is the fraction of women in group k, D stands for 
changes between time t and t + 1, w_k = (wkt + wkt+1)/2, and P
_
k = (Pkt + Pkt+1)/2.
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 Source: Authors’ calculations, based on microdata from national household surveys.
a. Women aged twenty-five to fifty-four years. Unweighted means for Latin American countries. Married: includes formal and consensual 
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F I G U R E  3 .  Female Labor Force Participation by Marital Status: Latin America, 1992–2012a
11. See, for example, Elias and Ñopo (2010) and Amador, Bernal, and Peña (2013), for an 
implementation of this decomposition.
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If changes in the distribution of the variable used to define the groups are 
the main drivers of changes in LFP, the second term will be relatively large. 
Consider the case of education. If more women have access to higher educa-
tion levels, which are linked to higher labor participation rates, then the pro-
cess of education expansion could be the main driver of the global increase 
in female LFP. As shown in table 1, female LFP increased 9.1 points in the 
1990s. The within effect accounts for 6.6 points, meaning that if no changes 
in education had occurred in that decade female LFP would have nonethe-
less increased by that amount.12 The composition effect implies that if the 
T A B L E  1 .  Decomposition of Changes in Female Labor Force Participation: Latin America, 
1992–2012a
Explanatory variable
Period
1992–2002 2002–12 1992–2012
Education
Difference 9.1 3.6 12.7
  Within effect 6.6 0.9 7.4
  Composition effect 2.5 2.7 5.3
Age
Difference 8.9 3.5 12.4
  Within effect 9.0 3.7 12.7
  Composition effect -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Marital status
Difference 8.5 4.3 11.2
  Within effect 8.1 3.5 9.7
  Composition effect 0.4 0.8 1.5
Children
Difference 10.0 3.7 13.7
  Within effect 9.5 3.0 12.6
  Composition effect 0.5 0.7 1.1
Area
Difference 7.7 3.9 11.6
  Within effect 7.2 3.8 10.9
  Composition effect 0.5 0.1 0.7
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on microdata from national household surveys.
a. Women aged twenty-five to fifty-four years. Unweighted means for Latin American countries.
12. Besides changes in the propensity to participate in the labor market, the within effect 
may also be driven by changes in the composition of groups in terms of unobserved character-
istics, which may be playing a role in the differential patterns observed in the first versus the 
second period under analysis. Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis with the available 
data, nor do we have anecdotal evidence of changes in this direction.
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propensity to participate in the labor market had not changed within groups 
over the decade, female LFP would have nonetheless increased 2.5 percent-
age points due to a more educated composition of the female population.13
The results in table 1 suggest that changes in education, marriage, fertility, 
and location all favored a more intense labor market involvement of women.14 
Today, women are more educated, have fewer children, and are more likely 
to remain single than two decades ago. In this scenario, even with the same 
conditional propensity to participate in the labor market, the overall female 
LFP rate should increase. The contribution of these factors to the observed 
increase in female LFP in the 1990s was significant but not dominant. In the 
2000s, however, their role seems to have been decisive: without the changes in 
the structure of the female population—in particular, in terms of education— 
the deceleration in the growth of female LFP documented in the previous 
section would have probably been more marked.
Using similar decompositions, we also find evidence in our earlier work 
that changes in the structure of employment toward more women-friendly 
tasks may also have contributed to increasing labor force participation.15 At 
the same time, changes in the sectoral structure of the economy may have 
operated in the opposite direction, contributing to the observed deceleration 
in female LFP. That impact was probably rather small, however, leaving the 
phenomenon of strong deceleration largely unexplained.
Busso and Romero Fonseca combine a meta-analysis with a multivariate 
regression framework, based on a panel data set of Latin American countries, 
to study trends in factors that have been typically singled out as key determi-
nants of female LFP, such as contraceptive methods, household appliances, 
and telework.16 They find that changes in these factors could not account for 
13. A word of caution about the interpretation of these results. The decomposition suggests 
that for some autonomous reason, there was an expansion in education in Latin America, and a 
more educated pool of women almost mechanically implied higher LFP. In this light, the results 
of the decompositions indicate, for instance, that the policies that were successful in fostering 
labor participation in the 2000s were mainly the education policies that allowed the expansion 
of schooling in the previous decades. Of course, the real world could be more complicated. For 
example, the government may have previously encouraged employment in a sector that requires 
skilled labor intensively, and the increased demand stimulated women to finish high school or 
college to get a job in that sector. In this case, the sector/employment policy is triggering the 
reaction in the rest of the variables. In stressing the results of the decompositions, we implicitly 
assume that these more complicated channels are of second-order importance, which we believe 
is not a strong assumption, at least for education.
14. Beccaria, Maurizio, and Vázquez (2015) find similar results for Argentina.
15. Gasparini and Marchionni (2015).
16. Busso and Romero Fonseca (2015).
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the recent deceleration in female LFP.17 They conclude that while innova-
tions or expansions in health, home, and work technologies, together with 
some cultural changes, seem important to account for the long-run increase 
in female LFP in Latin America, these factors cannot explain the recent decel-
eration. In fact, the deceleration took place even while several of those factors 
continued operating.
Approaching a Ceiling?
As any share, the rate of labor force participation has a ceiling. Of course, 
the only hard ceiling is 100 percent, but a host of reasons—including fric-
tions, cultural factors, individual preferences, and economic factors—usually 
make full participation unattainable. In Latin America, as in most regions 
of the world, the rate for prime-age men seems to have reached its ceiling. 
The unweighted mean of the participation rate for males aged twenty-five to 
fifty-four across Latin American countries has been around 95.5 percent for 
at least the last two decades.
Female labor force participation rates are still far from those of men, despite 
the large increase over the last half-century. The mean rate for prime-age women 
in Latin America is around 65 percent, 30 points lower than that of their male 
counterparts. Yet the evidence suggests that, unlike previous decades, in the last 
years this gap is shrinking very slowly, and that female LFP is even reaching 
a plateau in some economies of the region. One possible explanation for this 
deceleration is that female participation is approaching a conditional ceiling: 
female LFP will not pass a certain level if certain cultural and policy factors do 
not change. In that sense, the women’s ceiling is softer than the men’s ceiling, 
but it still represents a barrier, since only cultural transformations or strong 
policy interventions can substantially alter its level. If this interpretation of the 
recent deceleration as a nearby ceiling is correct, and no major cultural or policy 
changes occur, then we should expect female LFP in Latin America to reach a 
plateau, and the wide gap with men to persist in the future.
A plateau in female participation emerged in the United States around the 
1990s.18 Goldin reports that participation rates for women of almost all ages, 
17. See also Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) for the role of home production; 
Albanesi and Olivetti (2016) for the effects of technological progress in health and nutrition; 
and Goldin and Katz (2002) for the impact of contraceptive methods.
18. Blau and Kahn (2013); Goldin (2014).
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education levels, and marital statuses have leveled off in the United States.19 
The LFP rate for women aged twenty-five to fifty-four grew slightly from 
74.6 percent in 1992 to 75.9 percent in 2002 and then descended to 74.5 per-
cent by 2012. Consequently, many analysts have suggested that the economy 
may have reached some sort of natural female participation rate. That could 
also apply to Latin America, although at a lower ceiling.
This stagnation in female labor force participation is not a widespread 
phenomenon among the developed economies, however, with the exception 
of the United States and some Nordic economies (Denmark, Finland, and Ice-
land). In the richest twenty western economies, the female LFP rate grew at 
0.6 points a year in the 1990s and at 0.5 points a year in the following decade, 
rising from 70 percent in 1992 to 75.9 percent in 2002 and to 80.4 percent in 
2012. Although there are some mild signs of deceleration, female labor force 
participation continues to grow at healthy rates in most developed economies.
Figure 4 shows the female labor force participation rates for women aged 
twenty-five to fifty-four for groups of developed OECD countries. The pla-
teau is only visible for the United States, at a level ten points higher than the 
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19. Goldin (2006).
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average Latin American rate.20 The comparison of Latin America with Japan 
and Korea is interesting: the gap in female LFP tended to vanish over the 
1990s, but grew again in the 2000s given the deceleration in Latin America 
and the stable growth rates in the two Asian countries.
Data from the World Development Indicators reveal signs that female 
labor force participation has stagnated—or even decreased—in some East 
and South Asian countries, but not in Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, 
and Central Asia, where rates in the 2000s were similar to or even higher 
than in previous decades. A similar assessment emerges from the EAPEP 
Database (ILO, 2011). Data from that source suggest that female LFP rates 
in Central America are among the lowest in the world, surpassing only the 
Islamic countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East, where the inclusion 
of women in the labor market is limited due mostly to cultural factors. On 
average, the participation of South American women is higher than in some 
areas of Africa and South Asia, but lower than in Europe, Eastern Asia, and 
most of non-Muslim Africa.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell whether the recent deceleration in 
female LFP in Latin America reflects a natural convergence to a ceiling. How-
ever, we consider it unlikely for several reasons. First, with a few exceptions, 
most developed and some developing countries have female LFP rates well 
above those in Latin America, and they are still increasing. It is difficult to 
believe that the natural rate in Latin America is substantially lower than in 
most of the world. If Latin America were indeed reaching a ceiling, the per-
manent gap with more developed countries, and even with other developing 
countries, would be large, growing, and difficult to explain. For instance, even 
though Spain and Portugal are culturally very close to Latin America, their 
female LFP rates (81.1 percent and 85.5 percent, respectively) are much higher 
than those in the region.21
Second, the deceleration occurred throughout Latin America, regardless of 
the initial level of female participation. If the deceleration reflected a pattern 
of convergence to a long-run level, we would expect that only countries with 
relatively high LFP levels would experience a reduction in the participation 
20. The stagnation in the United States has been linked to weaker family-friendly policies, 
including parental leave and part-time work entitlements (Blau and Kahn, 2013).
21. Using data from the World Values Survey, Inglehart and Norris (2003) find that Latin 
American countries, Spain, and Portugal are in the same region of the cultural map of the world, 
based on the survival/self-expression dimension, which includes a wide range of beliefs and 
values. They find that “these values are strongly correlated with attitudes toward the role of 
women” (p. 156). Inglehart and Baker (2000) reach a similar conclusion.
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growth rate. However, as figure 5 documents, the deceleration also occurred 
in countries with a relatively low female LFP rate, which in principle have a 
longer way to go toward their equilibrium long-run level.
Finally, in most Latin American countries, the leveling-off pattern is more 
noticeable among vulnerable women, who are still far from the participation 
levels of their more educated, wealthier counterparts. Here again, the lower 
participation rate suggests that this group is farther from its long-run equilib-
rium and thus presumably far from approaching a ceiling.
Participation and Economic Growth
We have documented the contrast between the last two decades in terms of 
female labor force participation. The contrast also applies to other economic 
variables, a fact that hinders the search for causal relationships. In this section, 
we focus on economic growth since female labor participation is particularly 
sensitive to the macroeconomic environment. Changes in economic conditions 
affect female LFP directly, but also indirectly through a strong interdepen-
dence with the employment status of other household members, particularly 
male spouses.
The (unweighted) mean value of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
in Latin America grew at 2.8 percent annually in the 1990s; the rate almost 
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doubled in the 2000s (5.7 percent). In particular, the economies in the region 
grew at the very fast rate of 8.0 percent between 2003 and 2008. The 2000s 
were a decade not only of higher growth, but also of more macroeconomic 
stability with more stable growth rates, low inflation, and absence of big 
crises, which were endemic to Latin America in the previous decades.
The deceleration in female LFP coincided with a strong rise in GDP growth 
rates (see figure 6).22 Besides this temporal correlation, there are arguments to 
link the two patterns. The strong economic growth in the region in the 2000s 
allowed a surge in incomes that may have retarded the entry of women into 
the labor market. Without a more pressing need to look for a job, and given the 
higher earnings of their spouses or the cash transfers of new social programs, 
some women may have delayed their decision to participate in the labor market.
This argument could be viewed as a variant of the added-worker effect, 
which is typically invoked to account for the increase in female LFP during 
recessions.23 As the main breadwinner becomes unemployed or faces a wage 
cut, secondary workers—typically female spouses—enter the workforce to 
compensate for the reduced household income, implying a countercyclical 
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22. The linear correlation coefficient between changes in female LFP and per capita GDP 
is -0.50 and statistically significant.
23. See Katz (1961), Mincer (1962), Lundberg (1985), Maloney (1991), and Mattingly and 
Smith (2010).
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pattern of female LFP. Conversely, female spouses may be less willing to join 
the workforce during a strong expansion, as the male breadwinner improves 
his job conditions and household real income increases. The adjustment in 
female behavior does not necessarily imply the extreme change of leaving a 
job, but rather could entail postponing the entry into the labor market. With a 
more favorable economic environment in their households, women may not 
be compelled to accept just any job, but rather may wait longer for better job 
matches or delay their labor market participation a few years in order to spend 
more time with their children or older adults requiring care.
The argument views the family as a decisionmaking unit and assumes that 
some women are secondary workers with a less-permanent attachment to the 
labor market than their partners, a situation that is more frequent among less-
skilled women in the region. Under this framework, a married woman may 
choose to postpone her entry into the labor market, taking advantage of her 
husband’s income gain. Since individual incomes are pooled within the fam-
ily, an increase in one individual’s income may result in other family members 
working less in the labor market, thereby gaining time to spend on other activi-
ties, such as childcare. For a countercyclical pattern to emerge, this income 
effect must outweigh the substitution effect: namely, that in a better economic 
scenario, workers—both men and women—face better opportunities, and they 
may be more attracted to the labor market as their earning power increases.24
A number of studies find evidence on the added-worker effect in Latin 
America. In Argentina, Cerruti finds that female LFP increased in the 1990s 
in response to rising instability and unemployment among male primary earn-
ers.25 Also in Argentina, Paz finds a sizable impact of the husband’s labor 
status (employed or unemployed) on the probability of his spouse entering 
the workforce, mostly in the informal sector.26 Similar results are found by 
Fernandes and Felício for Brazil and by Parker and Skoufias for Mexico.27
This channel is likely to be more relevant for women in vulnerable house-
holds. Unskilled poor women with children are more likely to act as secondary 
24. For a countercyclical pattern to show in the data, the income effect must also outweigh 
the effect of other driving factors of LFP that could be positively correlated with economic 
growth. For instance, a large literature finds that the fast increase in female LFP in western 
Europe and the United States after World War II was mainly due to technological and cultural 
changes that were much stronger than the (negative) added-worker effect coming from the high 
postwar economic growth rates (Fernández, 2013; Goldin, 2014; Greenwood, Seshadri, and 
Yorukoglu, 2005; Olivetti, 2013).
25. Cerruti (2000).
26. Paz (2009).
27. Fernandes and Felício (2005); Parker and Skoufias (2004).
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workers, with more sporadic and loose links with the labor market, and their 
labor behavior is thus more sensitive to economic conditions. In addition, 
these are the women whose households benefited more from the improved 
economic scenario of the 2000s through three channels: a reduction in unem-
ployment, a relatively large increase in labor income, and an increase in non-
labor incomes.
Figure 7 illustrates the first channel by showing unemployment rates for 
prime-age men, that is, the likely husbands of prime-age women. While 
unemployment rates fluctuated somewhat for skilled men in the 2000s, 
they plunged for the unskilled. On average, the unskilled unemployment 
rate descended from 6.5 percent in 2002 to 3.5 percent in 2012. If female 
labor participation decisions are sensitive to the unemployment situation 
of the male spouse, figure 7 suggests a potentially relevant added-worker 
effect, particularly among unskilled women who are typically married to 
unskilled men.28
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28. On the presence of positive assortative mating in Latin America, see Ganguli, Hausmann, 
and Viarengo (2014) and Torche (2010).
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Regarding the second channel, the economic expansion of the 2000s implied 
a generalized increase in real earnings. Interestingly, this increase was more 
intense among the unskilled. Figure 8 shows that the hourly wage gap between 
skilled and unskilled prime-age male workers substantially decreased in the 
2000s. This suggests that not only did household incomes increase for women 
in more vulnerable households, but also that the increase was higher than 
for the nonpoor. Here again, the evidence points to a stronger added-worker 
effect for vulnerable women.
In addition to the improvements in the labor market, vulnerable house-
holds greatly benefitted from the sizable increase in social protection systems 
that took place in all Latin American countries in the 2000s—the third chan-
nel through which the added-worker effect operated. The strong economic 
growth of the 2000s improved the fiscal situation of the region’s economies, 
which in turn led to a substantial expansion in social spending. In particular, 
since the implementation of Progresa in Mexico and Bolsa Escola in Brazil, 
conditional cash transfer programs have continued to expand in the region 
(figure 9). The programs consist of cash transfers to poor households, condi-
tional on the households’ making certain investments in their children’s human 
capital—education, health, and nutrition. Cruces and Gasparini estimate that, 
on average, 78 percent of these transfers accrue to the bottom two quintiles 
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of the income distribution.29 In a sample of seven Latin American countries 
in 2014, the main cash transfer represented 33 percent of participants’ total 
household income, on average, for households in the bottom quintile of the 
income distribution.30 Cash transfer programs have been identified as an 
important factor driving the increase in real household income in more vulner-
able households, and they are thus a significant determinant of the observed 
fall in income poverty and inequality in the region in the 2000s. Although 
they are typically the main pillar of the social protection system for the poor, 
conditional cash transfer programs are not the only policy instrument aimed 
at helping the most disadvantaged. Noncontributory pensions, for instance, 
expanded significantly in the region in the 2000s, adding another source of 
income for vulnerable households.31
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29. Cruces and Gasparini (2012).
30. Own calculations based on national household surveys of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Peru, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay.
31. Bando, Galiani, and Gertler (2016).
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The expansion of cash transfer programs in Latin America was accompa-
nied by a profusion of impact evaluations. These studies mostly find negative 
but small effects on female labor supply. For instance, Mexico’s Progresa 
program has no statistically significant effects on women’s labor force par-
ticipation or hours worked.32 Nor are there any significant effects on the labor 
participation of women in Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social.33 However, 
more recent evaluations do find negative effects on female labor supply in 
a number of countries.34 As Busso and Romero Fonseca conclude from their 
meta-analysis, the cash transfer programs in Latin America probably did not 
cause a decrease in female LFP when the programs were launched, but the 
subsequent expansion seems to have contributed to halting the positive trend 
in female labor supply in recent years.35
In sum, the strong economic expansion that Latin America experienced in 
the 2000s had a more intense positive impact on the incomes of vulnerable 
households than nonvulnerable households, through several channels. The 
women in these households are precisely those more prone to alter their labor 
force participation decisions based on the family economic perspectives. It 
follows from this argument that we should observe a stronger deceleration in 
LFP for married, unskilled, more vulnerable women, a fact that is consistent 
with the evidence discussed in the first section. While this is far from conclu-
sive evidence supporting the added-worker effect, it suggests that this factor 
may have played a relevant role in the recent deceleration of female LFP. The 
next section elaborates on this issue by exploring labor force participation 
along the economic cycle in a regression framework.
Participation and the Economic Cycle
In this section we explore the movements of labor force participation over 
the business cycle within a simple econometric framework.36 In particu-
lar, we build a panel of countries from 1992 to 2012 and run fixed-effects 
32. Alzúa, Cruces, and Ripani (2013); Parker and Skoufias (2000); Skoufias and di Maro 
(2006).
33. Maluccio and Flores (2005).
34. Novella and others (2012) for Honduras; Fernández and Saldarriaga (2014) for Peru; 
Garganta, Gasparini, and Marchionni (2015) for Argentina.
35. Busso and Romero Fonseca (2015).
36. We are very grateful to Pablo Gluzmann for his active participation in this section.
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regressions of female LFP and other labor variables.37 As right-hand-side 
variables, we include the log of real per capita GDP (adjusted for purchasing 
power parity, PPP) taken from World Development Indicators (WDI) and, 
alternatively, a decomposition of GDP into two terms: a cyclical and a trend 
component. To divide GDP into components, we use the Hodrick–Prescott 
filter.38
The results from the regressions suggest that female labor supply is asso-
ciated with the economic changes and that this link is much stronger than 
for men (table 2). In particular, both the trend and cyclical components of 
GDP have a highly significant effect on female participation, although with 
different signs (second column in table 2). The trend component of growth 
T A B L E  2 .  Models of Labor Force Participation: Latin America, 1992–2012a
Explanatory variable
Female Male Relative (male/female)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log per capita GDP 20.8 -1.3 -0.663
(12.93)*** (2.07)** (10.80)***
Cyclical component of GDP -23.9 1.6 0.747
(4.04)*** (1.07) (4.32)***
Trend component of GDP 24.5 -1.5 -0.780
(16.23)*** (2.29)** (12.79)***
Constant -127.8 -161.4 107.0 109.1 7.628 8.689
(8.73)*** (11.76)*** (18.98)*** (18.03)*** (13.64)*** (15.66)***
No. observations 235 235 235 235 235 235
R-squared 0.89 0.91 0.72 0.73 0.83 0.86
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
a. Country fixed-effects estimations based on an unbalanced panel of seventeen countries (see footnote 37 for more details). Labor force 
participation is defined as the percentage of adults (women or men) aged twenty-five to fifty-four years who are employed or unemployed 
and actively seeking work. Robust t statistics are in parentheses.
37. The panel includes information for seventeen Latin American countries over the period 
1992–2012. The specific countries and years are as follows: Bolivia (1993, 1997, 1999–2002, 
2005, 2007–09, 2011); Brazil (1992, 1993, 1995–99, 2001–09, 2011, 2012); Chile (1992, 1994, 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2011); Colombia (2001–05, 2008–12); Costa Rica (1992–
2012); Dominican Republic (1996, 1997, 2000–12); Ecuador (1994, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2003–12); 
El Salvador (1995, 1996, 1998–2012); Guatemala (2000, 2006, 2011); Honduras (1992–98, 
2001–11); Mexico (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004–06, 2008, 2010, 2012); Nicaragua 
(1993, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2009); Panama (1995, 1997–2012); Paraguay (1997, 1999, 2001–11); 
Peru (1997–2012); Uruguay (1992, 1995–98, 2000–12); and Venezuela (1992, 1995, 1997–2011).
38. See Hodrick and Prescott (1997).
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is associated with an increase in female LFP: a 10 percent long-run expan-
sion in GDP is associated with a 2.45-percentage-point increase in female 
labor supply, on average. In contrast, the short-term movements are counter-
cyclical: a 10 percent short-run expansion in GDP is associated with a fall in 
female labor supply of about 2.39 percentage points.39 This piece of evidence 
seems to support the hypothesis of the recent deceleration driven by the 
exceptional growth rates of the 2000s.40
Consequently, the male-female gender gap in labor force participation 
has a negative relationship with the trend in GDP, but a positive rela-
tionship with the cyclical component (sixth column in table 2). Along the 
development process, female labor force participation increases, narrow-
ing the gender gap. However, short-term expansions are associated with a 
reduction in the entry of women into the workforce and hence a widening 
of the gender gap, possibly due to the reasons discussed in the previous 
section.
In table 3, we divide the sample by education level: men and women 
without a secondary degree; with a high school degree but without a col-
lege degree; and with a degree from a tertiary institution. We find that the 
negative cyclical component is larger and highly significant for women with 
fewer years of formal education (less than complete secondary school) and 
smaller for the rest. This difference is consistent with the discussion in the 
previous section, where less-skilled, vulnerable women are more prone to 
react to economic fluctuations. In particular, the sudden strong expansion 
of the Latin American economies in the 2000s may have been associated 
with a larger deceleration in the labor supply for this group of women.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present evidence for a significant deceleration in female 
labor force participation in the 2000s, breaking the marked increasing pat-
tern that characterized the region for at least fifty years. Disentangling all 
39. Employment is also related to GDP growth, for both men and women. The trend com-
ponent is particularly strong for women, whereas the cyclical component is not significant. 
Unemployment increases when GDP falls; both the trend and cyclical components are signifi-
cant for both genders.
40. Consistent with these findings, Busso and Romero Fonseca (2015) conclude that the 
effects of changes in macroeconomic conditions on female participation are likely explanations 
of the latter’s cyclicality.
2 1 8  E C O N O M I A ,  Fall 2017
T A B L E  3 .  Models of Labor Force Participation by Education Group: Latin America,  
1992–2012a
Education level and 
explanatory variable
Female Male Relative (male/female)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Less than secondary school
Log per capita GDP 17.7 -2.1 -1.036
(10.38)*** (3.18)*** (10.13)***
Cyclical component 
of GDP
-25.6 2.3 1.009
(3.91)*** (1.37) (3.56)***
Trend component 
of GDP
21.2 -2.4 -1.206
(13.33)*** (3.51)*** (11.89)***
Constant -106.3 -138.9 114.0 117.3 11.363 12.901
(6.86)*** (9.59)*** (19.21)*** (18.58)*** (12.20)*** (13.97)***
No. observations 235 235 235 235 235 235
R-squared 0.91 0.93 0.76 0.77 0.85 0.88
B. Complete secondary school or incomplete college
Log per capita GDP 8.9 -0.6 -0.251
(4.80)*** (0.86) (1.74)*
Cyclical component 
of GDP
-13.9 -0.5 0.032
(2.17)** (0.25) (0.05)
Trend component 
of GDP
10.8
(5.56)***
-0.7
(0.80)
-0.274
(1.71)*
Constant -11.5 -28.6 100.8 100.9 3.250 3.463
(0.69) (1.63) (14.73)*** (13.40)*** (2.46)** (2.35)**
No. observations 235 235 235 235 235 235
R-squared 0.82 0.83 0.69 0.69 0.81 0.81
C. Complete college
Log per capita GDP 7.1 0.2 -0.354
(4.45)*** (0.28) (6.83)***
Cyclical component 
of GDP
-9.0 2.0 0.425
(2.48)** (1.05) (3.17)***
Trend component 
of GDP
8.4 0.1 -0.419
(4.68)*** (0.09) (7.78)***
Constant 22.1 10.1 95.0 96.4 4.726 5.312
(1.53) (0.62) (13.04)*** (12.11)*** (10.00)*** (10.84)***
No. observations 235 235 235 235 235 235
R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.46 0.46 0.82 0.84
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
a. Country fixed-effects estimations based on an unbalanced panel of seventeen countries (see footnote 37 for more details). Labor force 
participation is defined as the percentage of adults (women or men) aged twenty-five to fifty-four years who are employed or unemployed 
and actively seeking work. Robust t statistics are in parentheses.
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the factors that may account for this pattern is not an easy task, since several 
potential driving factors were simultaneously at play during the period of 
study. Endogeneity issues and lack of data are among the serious obstacles 
for the empirical identification of the causal links between female par-
ticipation and its covariates. Since a comprehensive general equilibrium 
assessment of all the driving factors is not feasible, this paper takes a more 
modest approach: we deploy several empirical strategies aimed at contrib-
uting with pieces of evidence to assess the relevance of different plausible 
factors behind the observed patterns in female labor supply. Although cer-
tainly imperfect and incomplete, we expect that this patchwork of evidence 
will shed some light on the processes that have shaped female participation 
in Latin America.
We first analyze whether the patterns in female LFP are mainly accounted 
for by changes in the distribution of some direct determinants of the labor 
supply decision or whether they are chiefly the consequence of some more 
profound transformation in behavior. The results of the decompositions sug-
gest that changes in education, marriage, fertility, and location—that is, the 
composition effect—all favored a more intense labor market involvement of 
women. Without the observed educational and demographic changes in the 
female population, the deceleration in the growth of female participation in 
Latin America in the 2000s would have been even more marked.
There are several potential causes of the deceleration in the within-
group component of the growth in female LFP. One possible cause of the 
slowdown is that participation levels are reaching a ceiling or a natural 
rate that is mainly determined by cultural factors. We argue in this paper 
that this possibility is unlikely, although certainly not implausible. The 
deceleration in female labor force participation could instead be a transient 
phenomenon. The strong economic growth in the region in the 2000s may 
have allowed a surge in earnings and social protection benefits that retarded 
the entry of women into the labor market. In fact, the evidence suggests 
that, on average, those that did decide to participate found better jobs than 
in the past. In that light, the deceleration in participation may not represent 
a setback, since it would be the optimal response to a positive economic 
scenario. If the Latin American economies continue growing, the avail-
ability of decent jobs will rise, and as women continue to achieve higher 
education levels, their labor force participation is likely to resume its pace 
of growth in the near future.
However, an alternative interpretation leads to more worrisome conclu-
sions. The initial short-term impact of improved economic conditions and 
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41. In Gasparini and Marchionni (2015), we project poverty and inequality trends in the 
region under two alternative scenarios for female labor force participation. We conclude that if 
the observed deceleration of female participation in the 2000s is the beginning of a stage of low 
or even null growth in female labor supply, then the contribution of female participation to the 
reduction of poverty and inequality in the region would be negligible. This almost null effect 
contrasts with a significant, although small, poverty/inequality-reduction effect if the growth 
in female participation returns to the levels observed in the 1990s and in most of the twentieth 
century.
more generous social programs on female labor supply may have undesir-
able long-term consequences. Women who prefer to stay out of the labor 
market under the new economic situation may be less prone to participate 
in the future, even in a scenario of a greater supply of decent jobs. Being 
out of the labor market for some time may imply loss of productivity, and 
it may also reinforce traditional gender roles in the household. These fac-
tors may cause a reduction in attachment to the labor force for women and, 
ultimately, reduce their possibilities for autonomous income generation in 
the longer term. This would significantly dampen the outlook for poverty 
and inequality reduction.41
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T A B L E  A 1 .  National Household Surveys Used in This Study
Country Name of survey Acronym Surveys used
Argentina Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 1992–2003
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua EPH–C 2003–12
Bolivia Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 1992, 1993
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo ENE 1997
Encuesta Contínua de Hogares ECH 1999, 2000
Encuesta de Hogares EH 2001, 2002, 2005, 2007–09, 
2011, 2012
Brazil Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios PNAD 1992, 1993, 1995–99, 
2001–09, 2011, 2012
Chile Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional CASEN 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 
2011
Colombia Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2001–05
Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares GEIH 2008–12
Costa Rica Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 1992–2009
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 2010, 2012
Dominican Rep. Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 2011
Ecuador Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida ECV 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo ENEMDU 2003–12
El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 1995, 1996, 1998–2012
Guatemala Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones de Vida ENCOVI 2011
Honduras Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EPHPM 1992–99, 2001–11
Mexico Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares ENIGH 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004–06, 
2008, 2010, 2012
Nicaragua Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel 
de Vida
EMNV 1993, 1998, 2001, 2005, 
2009
Panama Encuesta de Hogares EH 1995, 1997–2012
Paraguay Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 1997, 2001
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 1999, 2002–11
Peru Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 1997–2012
Uruguay Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 1992, 1995–98, 2000–12
Venezuela Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo EHM 1992, 1995, 1997–2012
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Appendix: Data
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